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checked a financial statement of Great Security and that he had no intention
of paying Russell if the judgment in the present case proved unsatisfactory
to him. The lower court found that the issue was unauthorized, that at the
time Gwatney bought the stock Great Security was insolvent, that Gwatney
should have known of this since he had checked its financial statement, and
that Gwatney was not a bona fide purchaser. It therefore found no reason
not to order cancellation. On appeal, affirmed. In light of the definition of
bona fide purchaser in Black's Law Dictionary, it could not be said that the
lower court's finding was against the preponderance of the evidence. Gwat-
ney not being a bona fide purchaser, he could not take advantage of Arkan-
sas case law prohibiting cancellation in the hands of a bona fide purchaser.
Section 8-301(2) was quoted verbatim by the court. That section provides:
"A bona fide purchaser in addition to acquiring the rights of a purchaser
also acquires the security free of any adverse claim."
COMMENT
It is not clear from the court's opinion whether Section 8-301(2) was
relied on or not. If it was, then the court would have done well to look
to Section 8-302 for its definition of bona fide purchaser, instead of to Black's
Law Dictionary. The test is the same but the statutory wording is obviously
'preferable.
Assuming that the Code is applicable, there is still a question whether
the plaintiff's insistence that the stock be cancelled is the type of "adverse
claim" contemplated by the draftsmen in Section 8-301(2). "Adverse claim"
is not defined in the Code. Certainly, however, the plaintiff's claim is not
adverse in the sense that he is claiming the defendant's stock as his own.
In short, if the plaintiff's claim were considered to be something other than
"adverse," the defendant could not take free of it under Section 8-301(2)
even if he were a bona fide purchaser.
The court, in placing the burden of establishing bona fide purchase on
the holder, adopted a rule similar to that in Section 3-307(3) for holders in
due course. Once a defense is established, as here by plaintiff, the entire
burden is an the holder.
G.E.F.
ARTICLE 9: SECURED TRANSACTIONS
SECTION 9-102. Policy and Scope of Article
JACOBS V. NORTHEASTERN CORP.
206 A.2d 49 (Pa. 1965)
Northeastern Corp. entered into two construction contracts, one with
the General State Authority for the construction of a state building and the
other with the Secretary of Highways for the construction of state roads.
Each contract required Northeastern to furnish a performance bond and a
bond for the payment of labor and materials, and each gave unpaid labor
and materialmen a right of action against Northeastern and the sureties on
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the bond. The bonds were expressly made a part of the contracts. North-
eastern failed to pay certain labor and materialmen on each project and the
sureties made payment in compliance with the bonds. When a Northeastern
shareholder had the corporation placed in receivership, final payments under
both contracts were due and owing from the state. The sum of these pay-
ments was less than the amounts which the sureties were required to pay
under the bonds. In this action the sureties and Northeastern's receivers both
claim the payments due from the state. The trial court held that the sureties
were entitled to the payments under the doctrine of subrogation.
On appeal, the receivers contended, inter alia, that a security interest
was all that the sureties possessed in the payments due Northeastern under
the construction contracts, and that since they had not perfected their in-
terests in accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code, their interests
were subordinate to the rights given the receivers by that Code.
The court, in affirming the decision, held that under Pennsylvania law
sureties were entitled to the payments due from the state under the doctrine
of equitable subrogation. Payment of labor and materialmen was an obliga-
tion imposed upon Northeastern by the contracts. The funds which the state
rightfully withheld were to insure that Northeastern would meet this obliga-
tion, and in the event that it did not the state could have paid such claims
directly. Northeastern was entitled to the payment involved only if it had
paid the claims of labor and materialmen. Therefore, since it had not, the
payment should go to the sureties once they performed under the bonds,
just as it would have gone to the labor and materialmen (rather than the
general creditors) in the absence of the bonds.
In discussing the inapplicability of the Uniform Commerical Code,
the court concluded that under Section 9-102(2), Article 9 applies only to
security interests created by contract, and that "rights of subrogation, al-
though growing out of a contractual setting .. . do not depend for their
existence on a grant in the contract, but are created by law to avoid in-
justice." The court also noted that a filing under the Code could have served
no useful purpose because Northeastern, once having defaulted, was not en-
titled to the payments.
A dissenting opinion agreed with the majority as to the sureties' rights
of subrogation but nevertheless contended that the Code was applicable.
COMMENT
In United States v. Fleetwood & Co., 165 F. Supp. 723 (W.D. Pa.
1958), the Federal District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
held that Article 9 applied to a surety's interest in contract rights assigned
to it by a contractor as partial consideration for a performance bond, and
also that the surety's interest was subordinate to that of the contractor's
trustee in bankruptcy because of the surety's failure to perfect its interest in
accordance with the Code. The instant court footnoted the Fleetwood de-
cision and, after pointing out that Fleetwood involved only a performance
bond and not a bond for payment of labor and material and that the surety
in that case sought to prevail on the basis of the contractor's assignment and
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not on a subrogation theory, stated that it was not necessary for it to deter-
mine how it would have decided Fleetwood.
Despite the apparent conflict, the decisions in Fleetwood and the
present case are distinguishable and each is correctly decided. In the present
case, Northeastern was contractually obligated to pay the claims of labor
and materialmen and this contractual obligation gave the state agencies an
implied right to withhold monies if they determined that there were unsatis-
fied claims for labor and material. Therefore, once Northeastern defaulted
in payment, it was not entitled to the money withheld by the state agencies,
at least to the extent of the unpaid claims. Thus, to apply the doctrine of
subrogation under these circumstances deprives Northeastern's general credi-
tors of nothing to which they are entitled; not to apply the doctrine would
result in a windfall to them.
In Fleetwood, the payments involved were admittedly due the bank-
rupt-contractor. They had not been withheld to insure performance of a
specific obligation of the contractor. They had already been conditionally
earned. Under these circumstances application of the doctrine of subrogation
would have allowed the surety to claim, at the expense of the contractor's
creditors, a fund which it could have reached in no other way. Certainly,
if the surety were to prevail as a secured creditor because of the assignment,
it would have had to meet the requirements of the Code. This it did
not do, and an application of the doctrine of subrogation would clearly have
worked an injustice. A surety who has assumed the risk of the contractor's
default should not be placed in a preferred position because the risk insured
has occurred. But where the surety performs in accordance with its bond and
pays a claim, for the payment of which there exists a fund in which the con-
tractor has no rights because of default, the nonapplication of the doctrine
of subrogation would work an injustice.
V.A.S.
SECTION 9-104. Transactions Excluded From Article
FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER CO. V. DUTTON
205 A.2d 656 (Pa. Super. 1964)
In an action to replevy a stereo and television set, the plaintiff alleged
in its complaint that it had sold the set to defendant Dutton on a bailment
lease; that without notice to the plaintiff, Dutton had then moved from his
residence and had taken the set with him; and that Dutton having refused
to pay the plaintiff the balance due, the plaintiff was entitled to the im-
mediate possession of the set under the bailment lease. In its answer de-
fendant Amberson Gardens set out as new matter that it had leased an apart-
ment to William DiSantis; that because of DiSantis' defaults in rental pay-
ments, it had authorized a constable to distrain on all personalty in DiSantis'
apartment; that at the constable's sale it had purchased all the personalty,
including the stereo and television set; and that the plaintiff had failed to
give Amberson Gardens notice of its interest in the set within ten days of the
time that the set had been placed on the premises of Amberson Gardens, as
required by the Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951. The plain-
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tiff's reply denied all of the new matter except the averment that the plain-
tiff had failed to give notice, The lower court granted judgment on the plead-
ings for Amberson Gardens.
In reversing the lower court and remanding, the appellate court held
that no judgment could be had on the pleadings since there were controverted
fact issues as to the defendant's compliance with the Landlord and Tenant
Act. The appellate court also held that under Section 9-104 the Code did
not apply to landlord's liens. The Landlord and Tenant Act governed the
situation and under this act the plaintiff's right to replevy the set from
Amberson Gardens depended on whether the plaintiff had notified Amberson
Gardens of its interest within ten days of the time that the set had been
placed on the premises of Amberson Gardens.
COMMENT
The instant case is unclear as to how DiSantis obtained possession of
the set from Dutton. Compare In re Einhorn Bros., Inc., 272 F.2d 434 (3d
Or. 1959).
R.G.K.
SECTION 9-306. "Proceeds"; Secured Party's Rights on
Disposition of Collateral
RODI BOAT CO. V. PROVIDENT TRADESMENS BANK & TRUST CO.
236 F. Supp. 935 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 339 F.2d 259 (3d Or. 1964)
Annotated under Section 9-401, infra.
SECTION 9-310. Priority of Certain Liens Arising by
Operation of Law
CORBIN DEPOSIT BANK V. KING
384 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964)
After the effective date of the Code, Floyd Foreman gave the appellant-
bank a security interest in his motor vehicle, which the bank perfected by
appropriate filing under Section 9-302. While Foreman's obligations under
his security agreement with the bank were still in full force and unpaid,
Foreman had the appellee King make certain repairs on his car which
resulted in a statutory lien in favor of King for the value of the repairs.
Foreman did not pay either King or the bank and the bank repossessed the
car from King and sold it. King contended that under Section 9-310 his
artisan's lien took priority over the hank's security interest, even though
the bank's interest was perfected. The court agreed, basing its decision on
Section 9-310 and the additional fact that the statute creating the artisan's
lien contained no provision subordinating the lien to an earlier perfected
security interest. Since the Code was in effect at the time of all relevant
transactions and since its provisions were deemed to be incorporated into
any contract executed after its effective date, the court rejected the bank's
contentions that Section 9-310, as interpreted, unconstitutionally impaired
the obligations of contract and that the decision amounted to a denial of
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due process. The court also rejected the argument based on Kentucky Re-
vised Statute, sections 376.440, 376.445, and 376.450 that its "security
interest" was a "mortgage" which could not be subordinated to King's
artisan's lien without certain procedural steps being taken.
COMMENT
Where all relevant transactions are completed before the effective date
of the Code, the Code has expressly provided against the possibility that its
provisions will unconstitutionally impair the obligations of contract. Section
10-102(2) provides that the rights, duties and interests flowing from trans-
actions entered into before the effective date of the Code remain valid there-
after and "may be terminated, completed, consummated or enforced as re-
quired or permitted by any statute or other law amended or repealed by this
Act as though such repeal or amendment had not occurred."
In First Nat'l Bank v. Bohan, 198 N.E.2d 272 (C.P. Ohio 1964), annot.
6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 105 (1964), the plaintiffs perfected security
interests in a motor vehicle before the Code became effective. After the
Code became effective, an artisan repaired the vehicle and acquired an
artisan's lien. Under pre-Code law, a perfected security interest took
priority over a subsequently acquired artisan's lien. The court held that
under the circumstances priority should be determined by pre-Code law.
Not only did Section 10-102(2) require it, but also, if the decision were
otherwise, the adoption of the Code would have the effect of unconstitution-
ally impairing the value of the security interests which the plaintiffs had
perfected before the effective date of the Code.
P.J.N.
SECTION 9-401. Place of Filing; Removal of Collateral
RODI BOAT CO. V. PROVIDENT TRADESMENS BANK 8z TRUST CO.
236 F. Supp. 935 (E.D. Pa.), afi'd, 339 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1964)
Stuempfig bought a boat pursuant to a retail installment contract which
reserved title in the plaintiff-seller. This contract was filed in Florida. Ap-
proximately one year later, Stuempfig sold the boat in Maryland and de-
posited the proceeds in his account with the defendant-bank, which was
located in Pennsylvania. The defendant-bank set off a portion of the proceeds
in Stuempfig's account against a debt he owed the bank. The present action
was brought by the plaintiff-seller against the defendant-bank for the amount
still owed the seller by Stuempfig. The court held that the sale of the boat
by Stuempfig was a conversion and that the proceeds were impressed with
a constructive trust. Hence, when the bank set off a portion of the money
in Stuempfig's account, it unlawfully appropriated the seller's property. The
court stated that it was immaterial that the plaintiff-seller did not file the
contract in Pennsylvania under Section 9-401 et seq. and that the boat
was never in Pennsylvania.
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COMMENT
Assuming that Pennsylvania law applies, the court's use of a construc-
tive trust was both unnecessary and unfortunate in view of the provisions
of the Code.
The plaintiff-seller, by reserving title, possessed a security interest in the
boat. Section 2-401(1). By operation of law, the security interest continued
to exist in identifiable proceeds derived from the sale of the boat. Section
9-306(2). Even assuming that the plaintiff-seller's security interest in the
proceeds was unperfected, it would still, by implication of Section 9-301,
prevail over the bank's interest, since Section 9-301 does not subordinate an
unperfected security interest to the type of interest held by the bank which
was, at best, that of an unsecured general creditor.
R.W.D.
SECTION 9-402. Formal Requisites of Financing
Statement; Amendments
ALLOWAY V. STUART
385 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964)
In January, 1962, Schneider sold Stuart certain bowling alley equip-
ment. A chattel mortgage was executed in Schneider's favor and filed on
January 31. On June 26, 1962, a creditor of Stuart attached the equip-
ment, and two days later, when judgment was given, acquired a lien on the
property. More than a year later, the creditor amended his complaint to
allege that Schneider was asserting a conflicting interest in the equipment.
Schneider answered, setting up the mortgage. The creditor argued that
Schneider's lien was subordinate to his since the chattel mortgage which
Schneider had filed as a financing statement did not contain the signature
of Schneider as Section 9-402(1) required. The court, in affirming a judg-
ment giving Schneider's lien priority, held that Schneider's failure to sign
the financing statement was not, in view of the statement's "detailed nature,"
important. Since the statement substantially complied with Section 9-402(1),
it was effective under Section 9-402(6). Such a holding was consistent with
Section 1-102 which provides that the Code should be liberally construed
to promote its underlying purposes. The court concluded by saying that
during the transitional period when the bar is familiarizing itself with the
changes made by the Code, a certain degree of indulgence was to be expected
from the bench.
COMMENT
Section 9-402(1) says, in part, two things: first, that a copy of a
security agreement may be filed as a financing statement, and second, that a
financing statement, unlike a security agreement, must contain the signature
of the secured party. The court, in excusing the secured party's failure to
sign in the present case, emphasized that the financing statement actually
filed was of a "detailed nature" and that its notice giving function was not,
therefore, compromised. What the court failed to consider, however, was that
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the absence of the secured party's signature left the financing statement
without an authenticating symbol of no small importance. Compare In re
Kane, 55 Berks Co. L.J. 1 (Pa. 1962) in which a referee in bankruptcy held
that a photocopied signature of the secured party was insufficient to satisfy
the requirement of a signature.
S.L.P.
SECTION 9-503. Secured Party's Right to Take Possession
After Default
FORT KNOX NAT'L BANK V. GUSTAFSON
385 S.W.2d 196 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964)
Annotated under Section 1-208, supra.
SECTION 9-504. Secured Party's Right to Dispose of
Collateral After Default; Effect of
Disposition
FORT KNOX NAT'L BANK V. GUSTAFSON
385 S.W.2d 196 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964)
Annotated under Section 1-208, supra.
SECTION 9-507. Secured Party's Liability for Failure
to Comply With This Part
FORT KNOX NAT'L BANK V. GUSTAFSON
385 S.W.2d 196 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964)
Annotated under Section 1-208, supra.
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